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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, various aspects of state energy regulation. Since traditional oil
and gas regulation matters are covered elsewhere in this Survey,
this article is limited primarily to cases concerning the regulation of elec-
tric and natural gas utilities. The majority of the significant cases during
the Survey period continue to focus on the interpretation and implemen-
tation of statutes and rules resulting from the deregulation of the electric
utility industry in Texas.
II. ELECTRICITY REGULATION
A. RECOVERY OF CARRYING COSTS ON STRANDED COSTS
In a decision that could have a significant financial impact on both elec-
tric utilities and Texas ratepayers, the Texas Supreme Court held that
electric utilities are allowed to recover carrying costs on stranded costs
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from the first day of deregulation. As a result of the Court's ruling in
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, electric
utilities are "potentially entitled to billions of dollars in interest" that
would be collected through higher electricity rates.'
As part of the transition to a competitive electric market, electric utili-
ties are allowed to recover their "net, verifiable, nonmitigable stranded
costs incurred in purchasing power and providing electric generation ser-
vice" in accordance with the Public Utility Regulatory Act ("PURA"). 2
Although PURA recognizes that there are carrying costs associated with
generation assets,3 it is silent with respect to their recovery in the true-up
proceeding.
The sole issue before the Texas Supreme Court was determining the
correct date from which carrying costs on a utility's stranded cost true-up
balance should be calculated-the first day of deregulation, January 1,
2002, or the date of the Public Utility Commission's ("PUC") final order
in the true-up proceeding, some time after January 10, 2004. In adopting
PUC substantive rule 25.263(l)(3), the PUC determined that interest
should be calculated on stranded costs from the date of the final order of
the true-up proceeding. 4 CenterPoint and other utilities appealed this
portion of rule 25.263, arguing that interest should be recoverable starting
January 1, 2002, the date competition began.
In a five to four decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that rule
25.263(l)(3) is invalid. The majority determined that the rule conflicted
with the legislative intent to provide for full recovery of stranded costs
because it delayed the accrual of interest for up to two or three years
after the beginning of deregulation. 5 In a dissenting opinion written by
Justice Brister, the minority disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that it
was impossible for the PUC's rule to be inconsistent with PURA's der-
egulation provisions because there was no mention of interest in the stat-
ute.6 The Court remanded the issue to the PUC for further consideration
of whether to address interest in a general administrative rule or in util-
ity-specific contested-case hearings.
B. PUC JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
In In re Entergy Corp., the Texas Supreme Court held that the PUC has
exclusive jurisdiction over private settlement agreements resolving con-
tested-case proceedings before the agency.7 In 1992, Entergy purchased
Gulf States Utilities Company and filed a "Sales, Transfer, and Merger"
application with the PUC for the requisite approval of the transaction.
The various parties to the proceeding entered into a settlement agree-
1. 143 S.W.3d 81, 99 (Tex. 2004) (Brister, J., dissenting).
2. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.252(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
3. See id. § 39.301.
4. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263(1)(3) (2004).
5. CenterPoint Energy, Inc., 143 S.W.3d at 87.
6. Id. at 99.
7. 142 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2004).
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ment that was filed for approval by the PUC (the "Merger Agreement").
The PUC adopted the Merger Agreement and included it in an order
approving Entergy's application.
8
The Merger Agreement called for certain anticipated merger-related
savings to be shared between ratepayers and shareholders. The savings
were to be implemented in three post-merger rate cases. The first two
rate proceedings contemplated in the Merger Agreement were filed and
completed, but the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 7, the deregula-
tion statute, before the third case could be filed as anticipated in Novem-
ber 2001. Senate Bill 7 froze electricity rates through December 31, 2001
and mandated that retail competition would start on January 1, 2002. En-
tergy was not required to file a rate case in November 2001. Entergy
requested that the start of retail competition be delayed in its service
area, which would allow it to continue to charge its customers the frozen
electric rates ordered by Senate Bill 7. An agreement was reached to
delay the start of retail competition in the Entergy service area until Sep-
tember 15, 2002 (the "Settlement Agreement"). The PUC issued an or-
der adopting the Settlement Agreement in December 2001. 9
In February 2002, ratepayers sued Entergy in district court, claiming
that the Merger Agreement was breached when Entergy entered into the
Settlement Agreement with the PUC. The ratepayers argued that En-
tergy's action was a violation of the Merger Agreement because the Set-
tlement Agreement conflicted with the third rate case requirement of the
Merger Agreement. Arguing that the PUC had exclusive jurisdiction
over this dispute, Entergy filed a motion to transfer venue, a motion to
dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and a motion to abate.
The district court denied these motions, and Entergy sought a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals. After being denied by the court of
appeals, Entergy filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Texas
Supreme Court to determine the primary issue of whether the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction.
The ratepayers argued that the Merger Agreement was merely a pri-
vate contract and that, because they were not directly challenging a PUC
order, the PUC had no jurisdiction over the dispute with Entergy.t ° But
the court rejected this line of reasoning, holding that, although the
Merger Agreement began as a private contract between the parties, it
became the basis for the PUC's regulatory approval of the merger.1" The
Merger Agreement was practically meaningless without the implement-
ing order-the very administrative character that gave the Merger Agree-
ment effect also gave the PUC authority to adjudicate disputes arising
from that agreement. 12 The Texas Supreme Court held that the PUC had
8. Id. at 319.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 323.




exclusive jurisdiction in this case.13
C. PRICE-TO-BEAT RULE
During the Survey period, there were several challenges to the PUC's
price-to-beat rule. The PUC first promulgated rule 25.41 in 2001 to gov-
ern the adjustments to the fuel-factor portion of the price-to-beat rule
pursuant to PURA section 39.202(l).14 In 2003, the PUC amended por-
tions of rule 25.41 concerning the use of an electricity commodity index
for adjustment of the fuel factor and the process for adjusting the price-
to-beat following true-up proceedings. 15 The first case discussed in this
section was a direct appeal of the validity of amended rule 25.41. The
case following was a challenge to a fuel-factor adjustment that was calcu-
lated pursuant to the 2001 version of rule 25.41. In both cases, rule 25.41
was upheld.
1. Amended Rule 25.41
In State of Texas v. Public Utility Commission of Texas,16 the Office of
Public Utility Council, and other appellants, alleged that a number of
provisions of amended rule 25.41 violated PURA, including:
(1) the rule's provision regarding a provider's required showing to ob-
tain an increase of the fuel-factor component of the price-to-beat;
(2) the rule's use of an electricity commodity index to assess the ade-
quacy and adjustment of the fuel-factor component; and
(3) the rule's provision for post-true-up adjustments. 17
The appellants also contended that the rule's forty-five-day timeline for
contested cases violated due process and that the PUC failed to support
the amendments to rule 25.41 with reasoned justification as required by
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 18
The PUC contended that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over the challenges to the validity of the unamended portions of rule
25.41. The agency argued that portions of the amended rule, promul-
gated through the former rule could not be challenged in this proceeding
because those provisions were not challenged by direct appeal in 2001.19
The PUC's position was that the appellants' protests of the use of market
prices and the NYMEX method to adjust fuel factors in the amended rule
were waived because the methodology was the same as the methodology
13. Id.
14. The Third Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the 2001 rule 25.41 against a
challenge that the PUC erred by failing to establish sufficient headroom. See Reliant En-
ergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 62 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
15. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.41 (2004).
16. 131 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied).
17. See id. at 320; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25.41(g)(1), 25.41(g)(1)(F), 25.41(g)(3)(B)
(2004).
18. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131 S.W.3d at 310; see 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.41(g)(1)(D)
(2004); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.033 (Vernon 2000).
19. Pub. Uti. Comm'n, 131 S.W.3d at 320.
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employed in the 2001 rule.20 Rejecting the PUC's argument, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over all of
the challenges to the amended rule because the PURA direct appeal pro-
vision does not distinguish between original and amended rulemakings
nor does it limit the direct appeal to "challenges of amended subparts of a
rule."2'
The court also rejected the appellants' argument that amended rule
25.41 did not require an affiliated retail electric provider ("AREP") to
provide the proof required under PURA to obtain an increase of the
fuel-factor component of the price-to-beat.22 PURA allows the PUC to
adjust the fuel factor up to twice a year if the AREP "demonstrates that
the existing fuel factor does not adequately reflect significant changes in
the market price of natural gas and purchased energy used to serve retail
customers. '23 The PUC's amended rule 25.41 provided that an adjust-
ment to the fuel factor can be made when there is a five-percent change
over a twenty-day period in the average of the NYMEX Henry Hub nat-
ural gas prices.24 The appellants contended that the amended rule failed
"to implement the PURA requirements that an AREP show that the
market price of both natural gas and purchased energy used to serve re-
tail customers had significantly increased and that the existing fuel factor
was inadequate. '2 5 The appellants claimed that "the formulaic use of the
NYMEX natural gas index" did not permit an AREP to obtain an in-
creased fuel factor and price-to-beat-even if the price paid for electricity
had not increased and the AREP did not rely on natural gas for genera-
tion.26 But the court disagreed, stating that PURA did not either pre-
scribe "the means by which AREPs must demonstrate the need for an
increase in their fuel factor" or prohibit the PUC from "creating a for-
mulaic means for AREPs to demonstrate that a fuel factor does not ade-
quately reflect a significant change in the market price of energy."' 27 The
court further concluded that allowing an AREP's fuel factor and its re-
sulting price-to-beat to vary with the market was "reasonably consistent"
with the legislative intent to encourage and aid market competition.
28
The Austin Court of Appeals disagreed with all of the appellants' re-
maining challenges to the validity of amended rule 25.41. It found that
the challenge to the portion of rule 25.41 relating to the use of an electric-
ity commodity index to assess the adequacy of the fuel factor was prema-
ture because there was "no sufficiently liquid electricity commodity index
or hub that can be utilized by the Commission to adjust the fuel-factor
20. Id. at 321.
21. Id.; see TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.001(e), (f) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
22. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131 S.W.3d at 325.
23. TEX. UrnL. CODE ANN. § 39.201(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
24. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.41(g)(1)(D) (2004).
25. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131 S.W.3d at 322.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 324-25.
28. Id. at 325.
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component. '29 The court also rejected the appellants' contention that the
PUC exceeded its authority by including the provisions of rule 25.41 that
adjusted the price-to-beat after stranded cost true-up proceedings. 30 The
court was also not persuaded by the appellants' claims that the time
schedule for challenges to fuel-factor adjustments violated due process
and that the PUC did not provide a reasoned justification for the amend-
ments to the rule.31
2. Fuel-Factor Adjustment Proceeding
In City of Alvin v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, several Texas
cities appealed the PUC's order increasing First Choice Power, Inc.'s fuel
factor pursuant to the 2001 version of rule 25.41.32 The PUC determined
that there was a 22.69% difference between the average price of natural
gas used to set First Choice's fuel factor and the average price of natural
gas on the NYMEX index for the ten business days prior to First Choice's
application for a fuel factor adjustment. Based on this finding, the PUC
issued an order approving an increase in First Choice's fuel factor. The
cities sought judicial review of the PUC's order in district court, which
found that most of the cities' claims were validity challenges to rule 25.41
and, thus, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Austin Court of Appeals found both impermissible validity chal-
lenges to the rule and jurisdictional challenges to application of the rule. 33
The court agreed with the district court's determination that it lacked ju-
risdiction to consider whether the PUC's use of the NYMEX index in
rule 25.41 was permissible.34 The appropriateness of the PUC's use of
the NYMEX index was properly decided in the rulemaking proceeding.
It could not be challenged in a ratemaking proceeding. 35
The court rejected the cities' argument that First Choice's evidence of
NYMEX index rates is not by itself sufficient evidence of "the adequacy
of the fuel factor to reflect significant changes in the market price of natu-
ral gas and purchased energy used to serve retail customers. ' 36 The cities
claimed that "evidence of the NYMEX index alone" did not satisfy the
requirements of PURA, but the court found that PURA employed
changes in market price, not actual price, as the standard for determining
whether to adjust the fuel factor.37 The NYMEX index is "conclusive
evidence" of the requirements of PURA and rule 25.41. 38
29. Id.
30. Id. at 326-27.
31. Id. at 326, 332.
32. 143 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
33. Id. at 880.
34. Id. at 885.
35. Id. at 884.





The cities argued unsuccessfully that the fuel-factor adjustment vio-
lated the statutory limit on the price-to-beat. PURA section 39.202(p)
provides that "in no event shall the price-to-beat exceed the level of rates,
on a bundled basis, charged by the affiliated electric utility on September
1, 1999, adjusted for fuel as provided by Subsection (b)."'39 The cities
claimed that First Choice's fuel-factor adjustment caused its resulting
price-to-beat to exceed its 1999 rate.40 The PUC responded, and the Aus-
tin Court of Appeals agreed, that this subsection applies only when the
PUC finds that "the provider is unable to maintain financial integrity" if
it acts in accordance with PURA section 39.202(a), which defines the
price-to-beat and its period of applicability.41 The fuel-factor adjust-
ments provided for in section 39.202(1) were not limited by subsection
(p).42
The cities argued that the forty-five-day timeline for the fuel-factor ad-
justment process was not long enough and it prevented them from gather-
ing sufficient evidence and conducting a legitimate hearing. 43 Noting that
this complaint would have been more appropriately brought in the
rulemaking proceeding, the Austin Court of Appeals found that there
was no evidence that the cities had been deprived of due process.
44
In their final argument, the cities contended that the PUC violated
PURA by failing to require First Choice to pay the cities' rate-case ex-
penses. Section 33.023(b) of PURA specifies that an "electric utility" is
responsible for reasonable rate-case expenses.45 Although the cities con-
tended that an AREP was an electric utility for the purpose of rate-mak-
ing proceedings, "retail electric provider" is expressly excluded from the
statutory definition of "electric utility."'46 Relying on the plain language
of PURA, the Austin Court of Appeals held that an AREP was not an
electric utility and was not required to reimburse the rate-case
expenses. 47
D. UNBUNDLED COST OF SERVICE PROCEEDING
Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas concerns an
appeal of the PUC's final order in an Unbundled Cost of Service
("UCOS") proceeding that set transmission and distribution rates for Re-
liant Energy.48 The district court upheld the order except for a portion of
the PUC's decision concerning interest on excess mitigation credits. On
appeal, the parties challenged the order regarding four general issues:
39. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.202(p) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
40. City of Alvin, 143 S.W.3d at 887.
41. Id. at 888.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 888-89.
45. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 33.023(b) (Vernon 1998).
46. Id. § 31.002(6)(H).
47. City of Alvin, 143 S.W.3d at 890.
48. 153 S.W.3d 174, 183 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
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(1) elements of the rate base; (2) rate of return; (3) rate-case expenses;
and (4) rate design.
1. Rate Base
The parties had three objections to the PUC's determination of Reli-
ant's rate base in the forecasted 2002 test year: (1) "the propriety of the
failure to include an overfunded retirement plan in the rate base," (2)
"the inclusion of facilities in use at year's end rather than figuring a year-
long average by pro-rating the cost of facilities brought on line during the
year," and (3) "the accuracy of the amount of transmission system cost"
allocated for the interconnection of a merchant generator, known as
Merchant Plant 4.49 The challenges all concerned PURA's mandate that
only property that is "used by and useful to the utility in providing ser-
vice" might be included in Reliant's rate base.50 The Austin Court of
Appeals upheld the PUC's order on the first two issues but overturned
the order regarding the allocation of costs for Merchant Plant 4.51
First, Reliant argued that the PUC should have included in Reliant's
rate base the amount in its retirement plan exceeding the funds required
to satisfy its retirement obligations.5 2 Reliant contended that the PUC's
decision on the overfunding was not supported by substantial evidence
and was inconsistent with the PUC's prior treatment of underfunding of
Reliant's retirement fund.53 The court disagreed with both of these argu-
ments, holding that it is not unreasonable for the PUC to have concluded
that excess plan funds are not additionally beneficial and useful in provid-
ing electricity and should not be included in the rate base.54
Several intervenors next argued that the PUC should not have allowed
Reliant "to calculate its rate base using the amount it anticipated invest-
ing in transmission facilities by the end of 2002." 55 The PUC should have
instead used the amount of investment made as of June 30, 2002 because
under the year-end method the rates could be paid for the entire year for
a plant that is used only on the last day of the year.56 But the Austin
Court of Appeals found that "PURA does not specify when during the
forecasted test year the TDU's investments must occur in order to be
included in the utility's rate base."' 57 Thus, it was within the PUC's dis-
cretion to choose to use the year-end rate base. 58 The court also relied on
a Texas Supreme Court holding that a plant does not always have to be in
use in order to be sufficiently "used and useful" to include in the rate
49. Id. at 185.
50. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 36.051, 36.053(a) (Vernon 1998).
51. Reliant Energy, Inc., 153 S.W.3d at 186-92.
52. Id. at 185.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 186.
55. Id. at 187.
56. Id.





The third challenge to Reliant's rate base concerned the amount of
costs allocated for interconnecting the Reliant transmission system to
Merchant Plant 4. Reliant's expert witness originally testified that it
would cost an estimated $107.3 million for the interconnection of
Merchant Plant 4. In his rebuttal testimony, the Reliant witness revised
this cost estimate to $50.2 million. But the PUC added $107.3 million,
rather than $50.2 million, to Reliant's rate base. After reviewing the re-
cord of the ratemaking proceeding, the court concluded that the testi-
mony concerning the revised figure was uncontroverted. 60 It agreed with
the challengers that the PUC's inclusion of Reliant's original cost esti-
mate for Merchant Plant 4 was inadvertent and not based on substantial
evidence. 61 The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the inclusion of the
$107.3 million and remanded this issue to the PUC.6
2
2. Return on Equity
Several intervenors challenged the PUC's determination of the rate of
return applicable to Reliant in the ratemaking proceeding. As a part of
the restructuring process, the PUC initiated a generic proceeding to re-
solve issues common to all transmission and distribution utilities. The
goal of the generic proceeding was to "streamline" the utility-specific
ratemaking proceedings. 63 Return on equity was among the issues con-
sidered in the generic proceeding. Intervenors argued (1) that the PUC
was not authorized "to conduct a generic proceeding to determine a sin-
gle issue common to several utilities," (2) that the PUC "acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by using the generic return on equity for Reliant," and
(3) that the generic return on equity was "not reasonable" because it
failed to account for reductions of interest rates during the period be-
tween the generic proceeding order and the Reliant order.64 In this ap-
peal, the court denied all of these arguments and affirmed this portion of
the PUC's order. 65
The intervenors claimed that the generic proceeding was improper be-
cause the PUC did not enact a procedural rule for considering an issue
common to several utilities in a single generic proceeding. But the court
found that the generic proceeding was authorized under PUC rules.66 A
proceeding may be severed if the severance would "serve the interest of
efficiency or prevent unwarranted expense or delay."'67 Likewise, pro-
ceedings may be consolidated if the proceedings "involve common ques-
59. Id; see Cities for Fair Util. Rates v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 924 S.W.2d 933,
941-42 (Tex. 1996).
60. Reliant Energy, Inc., 153 S.W.3d at 192.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 183.
64. Id. at 193-96.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 194.
67. Id.; see 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 22.34(b) (2004).
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tions of law or fact" and "consolidation would be more time- and cost-
efficient. ' 68 Although intervenors argued that the PUC rules did not ex-
pressly identify "issues" in the consolidation proceedings provision, the
court concluded that severed issues become "proceedings" that may be
consolidated.69
The intervenors also argued that the PUC "acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously by using the generic return on equity for Reliant without consid-
ering the utility-specific factors listed in PURA section 36.052." 70 These
factors include: "(1) the efforts and achievements of the utility in conserv-
ing resources, (2) the quality of the utility's services, (3) the efficiency of
the utility's operations, and (4) the quality of the utility's management. ' 71
The PUC maintained that it did not consider these factors in the UCOS
proceeding because they related to "the utility's historical practices" and
were not applicable to a newly-unbundled transmission and distribution
utility.72 The Austin Court of Appeals agreed with the PUC that trans-
mission and distribution utilities were created during the transition to a
competitive market and thus had no records as stand-alone entities.73
Therefore, the PUC did not err by not taking into account non-existent
factors such as quality of service, management, and conservation
efforts.7 4
The intervenors' third complaint was that the PUC should have held
another hearing to determine the effect of the Federal Reserve Board's
reductions of short-term interest rates between the date of the final order
in the generic proceeding and the date of the final order in Reliant's
UCOS proceeding on the reasonableness of the rate of return. 75 The
Austin Court of Appeals held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in
deciding not to reopen the record to consider the changes in interest
rates.76 The failure of rates to account for interest rate fluctuations was
"inherent in the regulatory process. ' 77
3. Rate Case Expenses
The parties had three complaints regarding the PUC's determination of
Reliant's reasonable and necessary rate case expenses. These complaints
concerned: (1) the calculation of Reliant's consolidated tax savings, (2)
the application of a generic escalator to Reliant's vegetation control costs,
and (3) the failure to use surplus insurance funds to reduce Reliant's
68. Reliant Energy, Inc., 153 S.W.3d at 194; see 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 22.34(a)
(2004).
69. Reliant Energy, Inc., 153 S.W.3d at 194.
70. Id. at 195.
71. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.052 (Vernon 1998).
72. Reliant Energy, Inc., 153 S.W.3d at 195.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 196.




rates.78 Once again, the Austin Court of Appeals found no merit to these
challenges and affirmed the PUC's order regarding rate case expenses.
Reliant argued that the method used by the PUC to calculate the trans-
mission and distribution utility's share of consolidated tax savings consti-
tuted "impermissible retroactive ratemaking" because the tax savings had
already been apportioned in prior ratemaking cases. 79 The Austin Court
of Appeals previously held that "[a]s long as the Commission is not trying
to recoup past savings, but only trying to recover today's benefit from
those past savings, its calculation of consolidated tax savings does not
constitute retroactive ratemaking. '80 The court declined to overturn this
earlier decision and rejected Reliant's claim that the PUC's actions were
improper.8' The court also rejected Reliant's arguments that the PUC's
calculation of tax savings erroneously included the losses of companies
that would not be eligible to file a consolidated tax return with the trans-
mission and distribution utility and that the PUC's adjustment was arbi-
trary and capricious because it differed from the treatment of other
utilities in other PUC proceedings.82
Reliant also claimed that the PUC's decision "not to exempt its vegeta-
tion control expenses from the generic cost escalation factor" was not
supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.83
The court found that there was "evidence that increased expense of one
type that exceeded the escalator rate could nevertheless be balanced by
increases in productivity or decreases in other types of related ex-
pense."'84 Accordingly, the court held that the PUC's order was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 85
Finally, intervenors complained that the PUC failed "to reduce the
[Reliant transmission and distribution utility's] rates based on its share of
surplus funds from the Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited ("NEIL")
funds."' 86 Intervenors claimed that the PUC should have credited rate-
payers with Reliant's share of the surplus funds because Reliant's NEIL
premiums were "paid for and supported by ratepayer-derived funds."'87
The PUC chose to keep the NEIL assets with Reliant's generation com-
pany because they were "primarily generation-related" and could be
used "to reduce stranded costs in the 2004 true-up proceeding. '8 8 The
PUC maintained that ratepayers "received benefits from the NEIL pre-
miums through reduction of financial risk from catastrophic losses at the
78. Id.
79. Id. at 198.
80. Id. (quoting Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 36 S.W.3d 547,
557 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 200-01.
83. Id. at 201.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 203.
87. Id. at 204.
88. Id. at 203-04.
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nuclear plant" and through "credits for these rate expenses through
NEIL distributions. ' 89 The Austin Court of Appeals held that the PUC's
decision to not include the surplus funds was reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence.90
4. Rate Design
Intervenors challenged four elements of the rate design: (1) the trans-
mission cost recovery factor; (2) inclusion of an amount in rates for a
minimum cost necessary to distribute some electricity to every customer;
(3) the rate of escalation for coal fuel cost estimates; and (4) the rate of
reduction of the estimated capacity of generators. 9' The Austin Court of
Appeals rejected all of these arguments.
Intervenors complained that the PUC approved a transmission cost re-
covery factor that impermissibly passed through wholesale transmission
costs to retail customers.92 The court held that the transmission cost re-
covery factor applies only to the transaction between the distribution ser-
vice provider and the retail electric provider, which does not constitute a
retail transaction.93 Therefore, the transmission cost recovery factor did
not apply to retail sales.94 The court concluded that the PUC was author-
ized to adopt the transmission cost recovery factor to adjust wholesale
rates "to ensure the timely recovery of transmission investments. 95
The intervenors next argued that the PUC should not have abandoned
the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge ("AL") to reject
Reliant's "minimum plant" methodology for calculating "the investment
needed to connect customers and provide for minimum usage" as part of
its costs-of-service allocation.96 The AU rejected Reliant's methodology
because no other utility had used it and because the underlying plant
study was "questionable. '97 The PUC disagreed with the AU's reasons
and adopted the "minimum plant" methodology in its final order. The
PUC pointed to evidence in the record to support its rejection of the
ALJ's recommendation. The court agreed that this portion of the PUC's
order was supported by substantial evidence.98
Finally, intervenors' third and fourth objections concerned the PUC's
application of a three percent escalation rate to the price of coal for a
period of years and its adoption of a one-half percent annual reduction in
the capacity factor for Reliant's nuclear and coal power plant. Interven-
ors alleged that there was no evidence to support these PUC decisions. 99
89. Id. at 204.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 205.
93. Id.
94. Id.




99. Id. at 207.
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After reviewing the record, the Austin Court of Appeals rejected these
complaints and affirmed these portions of the PUC's final order. 10 0
E. PUC JURISDICTION OVER WHOLESALE TRANSMISSION COSTS
Under PUC rules governing wholesale transmission services, rates, and
access, each ERCOT utility was required to pay a "facilities charge" for
transmission service provided to other ERCOT utilities.10 1 In 2001, the
Texas Supreme Court invalidated a portion of these rules and held that
PURA gave the PUC only the authority to oversee a municipally-owned
utility's wholesale transmission rates, not the power to set the rates. 10 2 In
Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the
Austin Court of Appeals held that the PUC was authorized under PURA
to determine whether the terms under which wholesale transmission costs
are allocated between customers are reasonable. 10 3 This determination
of reasonableness did not constitute the type of ratemaking prohibited by
the earlier Texas Supreme Court decision.
In 1976, TMPA, a municipally-owned utility, contracted to sell power at
wholesale prices to four cities, including the City of Bryan. PUC whole-
sale transmission rate orders in 1997 and 1998 imposed greater costs for
transmission on the cities of Denton, Garland, and Greenville than on
Bryan. As a result of the increased costs, the TMPA board of directors
voted to have TMPA reimburse the three affected cities for a portion of
the transmission charges. This resolution caused an increase in TMPA's
budget and a reallocation of charges to all of the member cities.' 0 4
The City of Bryan filed a PUC complaint against TMPA alleging that
TMPA was requiring it to pay more for transmission service than the
PUC transmission orders allowed. The City of Bryan also asked the PUC
for a declaration that it could continue to nominate its own load for
power supplied by TMPA. The PUC ruled in favor of the City of Bryan
in the complaint proceeding and in a 1999 rate-setting proceeding also
held that the City of Bryan could nominate its own load and was entitled
to unbundled transmission service. TMPA sought judicial review of both
the complaint proceeding order and the 1999 rate-setting order. The dis-
trict court reversed and remanded both proceedings to the PUC in light
of the Texas Supreme Court ruling invalidating the PUC's authority to set
wholesale transmission rates.10 5
On appeal, TMPA argued that the PUC lacked the authority both "to
adjudicate contract rights" between the parties and "to set wholesale
transmission rates for a municipally-owned utility. 10 6 TMPA contended
that the district court erred (1) by denying TMPA's request for a declara-
100. Id.
101. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23.67, 23.70 (Vernon 2004).
102. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2001).
103. 150 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted).
104. Id. at 583.




tion and its motion for partial summary judgment that the PUC lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute and (2) by granting the City
of Bryan's motion for partial summary judgment that as a matter of law
PURA conferred jurisdiction upon the PUC to determine whether
TMPA's terms of transmission service were reasonable. 10 7 The Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of the City of Bryan and dismissal of TMPA's request
for declaratory relief.' 08
Although it acknowledged the PUC's general jurisdiction over whole-
sale transmission rates, TMPA claimed that the PUC did not have juris-
diction in this instance because TMPA does not provide wholesale
transmission service to the City of Bryan.109 Based upon TMPA's repre-
sentations in the prior proceedings that the City was a transmission ser-
vice customer and upon the court's examination of the definitions of
"transmission service" in PURA and PUC rules, the court of appeals re-
jected this argument-the City of Bryan was a wholesale transmission
customer of TMPA and the dispute was within the PUC's jurisdiction.110
TMPA also argued that, once the PUC determined that the City of
Bryan could nominate its own load, it was engaged in unauthorized rate
setting."' After reviewing the provisions of Chapters 35 and 40 of
PURA, the Austin Court of Appeals found that PURA gives the PUC
the specific power to determine whether wholesale transmission rates are
reasonable.' 12 The PUC has additional authority to ensure nondiscrimi-
natory access to transmission service and to resolve disputes between util-
ities by arriving at a reasonable wholesale transmission rate.113
F. FUEL RECONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS
In Cities of Abilene v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed the PUC's final order in a fuel reconciliation
proceeding. 114 The court disagreed with the cities of Abilene, San An-
gelo, and Vernon and held that the fuel costs and purchased power costs
requested by AEP Texas North Company (formerly West Texas Utilities)
could be properly recovered in a fuel reconciliation proceeding." 5
The cities contested the recovery of purchased power costs "incurred
before the commencement of commercial operations of the Southwest
Mesa Wind Farm.""11 6 In 1998, the PUC approved a settlement agree-
ment that included a mechanism for recovering costs associated with
107. Id.
108. Id. at 592.
109. Id. at 586-88.
110. Id. at 589.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 591.
113. Id. at 590.
114. 146 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
115. Id. at 752.
116. Id. at 745.
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AEP's purchased-power contract with Southwest after commercial opera-
tions began (the "Settlement Order")." 7 The cities argued that, as a re-
sult of the Settlement Order, AEP "agreed to relinquish the right to
recover the pre-commercial costs" associated with the Southwest contract
and was precluded from recovery of those costs in the fuel reconciliation
proceeding.11 8 Disregarding the recommendation of the ALJ in the con-
tested hearing, the PUC found that the Settlement Order was ambiguous
with respect to recovery of the pre-commercial costs and ordered that
these costs could be recovered by AEP.119 The court of appeals agreed
with the PUC's conclusion that the Settlement Order was ambiguous with
respect to the recovery of the pre-commercial costs associated with the
Southwest contract and found that the PUC's order that the costs were
recoverable in the fuel reconciliation proceeding was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. l20
The cities also protested the efficiency standard used by the PUC in the
fuel-reconciliation proceeding to determine the costs associated with
AEP's Oklaunion coal-fired power plant. The cities contended that the
PUC was required to use a standard set forth in a preliminary order to
calculate the efficiency of the Oklaunion plant.121 The cities' efficiency
standard measured the plant's efficiency by comparing it to other coal
plants in Texas. AEP argued for an efficiency standard that compared
the Oklaunion plant to similar coal plants throughout the United
States.122 The PUC disregarded its preliminary order and adopted the
AEP efficiency standard in the fuel-reconciliation proceeding. The PUC
found that the AEP efficiency standard was more representative of the
efficiency of plants like Oklaunion. The court of appeals found nothing
in the preliminary order that limited the PUC to a comparison of Texas
plants only. 123 Finding that the evidence in the proceeding was such that
reasonable minds could have reached the PUC's conclusion, the court of
appeals held that the order allowing recovery of AEP's requested costs
for the Oklaunion plant was supported by substantial evidence.' 24
G. PENALTIES ON DELINQUENT BILLS
In Volcanic Gardens Management Co. v. El Paso Electric Co., the El
Paso Court of Appeals held that a utility's five percent late payment
charge was not "interest" but rather a penalty the utility was authorized
to assess under PURA. 125 This case involved a dispute between El Paso
117. Id.
118. Id. at 746.
119. Id. at 747.
120. Id. at 750.
121. Id. at 746.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 752.
124. Id.
125. Volcanic Gardens Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. El Paso Elec. Co., No. 08-03-00208-CV, 2004
WL 1695890 (Tex. App.-El Paso July 29, 2004, pet. denied).
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Electric Company ("EPEC"), a municipal electric utility, and one of its
customers, Wet 'N' Wild.
Wet 'N' Wild sued EPEC, alleging that a five percent late payment
penalty on EPEC's invoices was illegal because:
(1) the late charge constituted a usurious interest that violated the
Texas Finance Code;
126
(2) the PUC had no statutory authority to issue rule 25.28(b), relating
to delinquent payment;
2 7
(3) the PUC had no power to delegate to EPEC the authority to assess
a late charge against customers;128 and
(4) EPEC had no authority to compose its own standards for deter-
mining whether to impose the late charge, and it applied the late
charge in an "arbitrary and discriminatory manner.1
' 29
The trial court granted EPEC's motions for partial summary judgment on
all of Wet 'N' Wild's claims.
In Wet 'N' Wild's appeal of the first issue, it argued that the late charge
violated the Texas Finance Code because the charge constituted "'inter-
est' which exceeded the maximum rate allowed under the statute.
1 30
EPEC contended that the late penalty was not "interest" subject to the
statute. 13 1 Under the usury law, there is no basis for usury if there is no
interest.132 The PUC's rule 25.28(b) states: "A one-time penalty not to
exceed 5.0% may be charged on a delinquent commercial or industrial
bill. The 5.0% penalty on delinquent bills may not be applied to any
balance to which the penalty has already been applied."'1 33 The court of
appeals found that "[a] plain reading of the rule shows that the charge
applied did not accrue nor continue to accrue against the principal bal-
ance in exchange for the detaining of a lender's money."'1 34 The late pay-
ment charge was simply a one-time penalty, not a "usurious interest."'
1 35
The second issue addressed by the court was Wet 'N' Wild's argument
that the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating rule
25.28(b). Wet 'N' Wild contended that the late payment charge was "ille-
gal and invalid because section 36.003 [of PURA] explicitly prohibits any
rate discrimination between classes and prohibits an electric utility from
establishing or maintaining an unreasonable difference concerning rates
between classes of service."'1 36 The court of appeals disagreed with Wet
'N' Wild's interpretation of section 36.003. It found that PURA grants
the PUC "discretionary authority to establish rates for classes of custom-
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *2; see TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 302.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
131. El Paso Elec. Co., 2004 WL 1695890, at *3.
132. Id.
133. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.28(b) (Vernon 2004).
134. El Paso Elec. Co., 2004 WL 1695890, at *5.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *6; see TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.003 (Vernon 1998).
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ers that are literally discriminatory if the rates are not unreasonably dis-
criminatory as to that class of customers. 1 1 37 Section 36.003 prohibits
only "unreasonable" rate differences between classes of customers. 138
The court upheld the validity of the PUC's rule 25.28(b).1 39
In its third complaint, Wet 'N' Wild asserted that the PUC illegally del-
egated to EPEC the discretion to assess a late payment charge. Wet 'N'
Wild argued that EPEC was engaged in "rate making," which is a func-
tion that the Legislature granted only to the agency.1 40 EPEC countered
that its PUC-approved tariff established that the late payment charge was
"not left to its discretion, but rather the Commission specifically author-
ized EPEC to charge the penalty in the uniform rate schedule of the
tariff."' 41 Section 32.101 of PURA requires a utility to file a tariff that
includes each rule that relates to or affects the rate of the service, prod-
uct, or commodity furnished by the utility.142 The court of appeals found
that EPEC's tariff rule was approved by the PUC and was not contrary to
rule 25.28(b). 143 The court held that the PUC did not illegally delegate its
rate-making authority to EPEC.144
In its final argument, Wet 'N' Wild alleged that EPEC "acted arbitrar-
ily" and violated PURA by charging late penalties to some customers and
waiving the late penalties for others.1 45 EPEC argued that its PUC-ap-
proved tariff provided that "EPEC may assess a one-time 5 percent pen-
alty on a delinquent commercial or industrial bill.' 1 4 6 The court agreed
with EPEC. Referring to section 36.003(e) of PURA, the court of ap-
peals found that EPEC was allowed to charge less than five percent with-
out being discriminatory. 147 Section 36.003(e) provides that "[a] charge
to an individual customer for retail or wholesale electric service that is
less than the rate approved by the regulatory authority does not consti-
tute an impermissible difference, preference, or advantage. '1 48
H. SERVICE EXTENSION AGREEMENTS
Double Diamond, Inc. v. Hilco Electric Cooperative, Inc. involved a
dispute between a developer, Double Diamond, and an electric-coopera-
tive, Hilco, over charges for distribution line extensions and facilities
under Hilco's tariff and an independent extension agreement. 1 49 Siding
137. El Paso Elec. Co., 2004 WL 1695890, at *6; see Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. AT&T
Comms. of the S.W., 777 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. 1989).
138. El Paso Elec. Co., 2004 WL 1695890, at *6.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id.
142. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 32.101 (Vernon 1998).
143. El Paso Elec. Co., 2004 WL 1695890, at *7.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *8.
147. Id.
148. TEX. UTnL. CODE ANN. § 36.003(e) (Vernon 1998).
149. 127 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
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with the customer, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Hilco. 150
In August 1996, the parties signed a written agreement that gave
Double Diamond a substantial discount to the construction charges pre-
scribed in Hilco's tariff for distribution line extensions. The agreement
provided that "upon termination [of the agreement], [Hilco's] approved
tariffs will be in effect."'1 51 The agreement expired in August 1997, but
the parties agreed to extend it in November 1997. The extended agree-
ment terminated in August 1998, but from the expiration of the agree-
ment in 1998 until August 23, 2000, the parties continued to do business
under the terms of the 1996 agreement.
Following a change in management in 2000, Hilco demanded payment
from Double Diamond for the construction work done between August 2,
1998 and August 23, 2000 under the rates of Hilco's tariff. Hilco refused
to construct any new electrical lines or facilities until the disputed charges
were paid. Refusing to pay the additional charges, Double Diamond filed
a complaint with the PUC. The PUC took no corrective action against
Hilco, so Double Diamond filed for judicial relief in district court.
Double Diamond requested an injunction to require Hilco to resume
construction of new lines and facilities and a declaratory judgment that it
owed Hilco nothing for the past extensions. The developer also alleged
tortious interference. Hilco counterclaimed for the unpaid construction
charges. The trial court granted Hilco's motion for summary judgment
for the amount of the unpaid charges and attorneys' fees.
152
In Double Diamond's appeal, the issue before the court was whether
questions concerning the existence of an implied agreement between the
parties created a genuine issue of material fact under the summary judg-
ment standard. Double Diamond argued that the parties had an implied
agreement to extend their original agreement following the termination
of the actual written agreement in August 1998. Double Diamond con-
tended that the rates and charges in the unregulated service extension
agreement, rather than the tariff provisions, controlled. 153 Hilco argued
that the provisions in its tariff regarding extension of service should be
used to calculate the disputed construction charges.
154
The court disagreed with Hilco's argument that the tariff, standing
alone, is a contract. 155 The court instead found that the tariff was a uni-
lateral document and the agreement of another party was required to
create a binding contract.156 Typically, such agreement is found in an
electric service agreement. The court of appeals determined that in the
absence of any such written agreement, an implied agreement would exist
150. Id. at 269.
151. Id. at 262.
152. Id. at 263-64.
153. Id. at 264.





between Hilco and any customer to which it began furnishing service
under the tariff.' 57 Further, the court found no authority prohibiting par-
ties from impliedly extending an agreement or entering into a new agree-
ment after a written agreement expires.' 58 Holding that a fact question
existed concerning the existence of an implied contract, the court over-
turned the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hilco.159
The court also concluded that summary judgment for Hilco based on the-
ories of suit on a sworn account and quantum meruit was improper.160
III. NATURAL GAS REGULATION
In Southern Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, the Texas Supreme Court
held that natural gas purchased by city customers from affiliates of the
franchisee was not subject to a franchise tax.161 The court found that the
City of Edinburg was not entitled to any franchise fees under its alleged
claims and reversed the trial court's award for damages. 162
The Rio Grande Valley Gas Company ("RGVG") and its successor,
Southern Union Gas Company, have supplied natural gas to customers in
the City of Edinburg under a series of franchise agreements since the
1920s (Ordinance No. 1129).163 As a result of changes in the Texas natu-
ral gas industry that occurred following the energy crisis in the 1970s,
RGVG in 1985 began buying some of the gas it provided to the City cus-
tomers from a special marketing program ("SMP"). 1 64 RGVG also filed
new tariffs with the Railroad Commission that allowed it to transport gas
for customers who chose to buy gas from other suppliers. These tariffs
were approved by both the Railroad Commission and the City, which
passed additional ordinances authorizing RGVG to provide this transpor-
tation service. 165 Under the later ordinances, the City was entitled to re-
ceive fees for transportation of natural gas. 166
The City of Edinburg asserted that all natural gas "sold by any com-
pany to consumers within the City was subject to the 4% franchise fee
under Ordinance No. 1129" if the gas was delivered by RGVG's system,
and subsequently filed suit to recover the lost franchise fees. 167 The City
also claimed that RGVG had transferred ownership of the gas transmis-
sion system to an affiliated company in 1987 without the City's con-
sent.' 68  The City further contended that the operation of the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 267.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 268.
161. 129 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2003).
162. Id. at 76.
163. Id. In 1993, Southern Union assumed all of RGVG's rights and obligations under
the franchise ordinance.
164. Id.; see R.R. Comm'n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1992).
165. S. Union Co., 129 S.W.3d at 77.
166. Id.




transmission system by RGVG's affiliate "constituted a purpresture in
public property. '169
In a lengthy and complicated judgment, the trial court awarded actual
damages for breach of contract and tortious interference against RGVG
and Southern Union, as well as their various affiliates and parent compa-
nies.170 The trial court declared that "certain pipelines and facilities lo-
cated within the City constituted a purpresture in public property in the
City's rights-of-way and an encroachment on the City's property without
its permission."' 171 The trial court also ruled that RGVG's parent com-
pany, Valero Energy Corporation, was vicariously liable for RGVG's con-
duct from 1985 to 1993, and that Southern Union was liable for any
liabilities of RGVG from 1985 to the date of judgment. 172 The trial court
disregarded the jury's award of damages for "RGVG's transfer of rights
or privileges under Ordinance No. 1129 without the City's consent. 173
The City of Edinburg claimed that RGVG and Southern Union were
obligated to pay franchise taxes on "all gas sold within the City that
passed through RGVG's or Southern Union's pipeline system, regardless
of which entity, affiliated or not, actually sold the gas to consumers within
the City."' 174 The City based its position on the language in Ordinance
No. 1129 designating a franchise fee to be imposed on "four (4%) percent
of [RGVG's] gross income derived from all gas sales within the City.' 75
The City contended that "income derived from transportation that was
provided by RGVG or Southern Union in connection with gas sales
within the City" were subject to the franchise fee provision. 176 The Texas
Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. Looking at the lan-
guage of the ordinance in its proper context, "[t]he reference to 'all gas
sales within the City' . . . means 'its [the Grantee's] gross income derived
from all gas sales [by the Grantee] within the City.' "177 Further, although
RGVG, for a two-year period from 1986 to 1988, provided transportation
services to customers within the City based on its rights under Ordinance
No. 1129, the City subsequently passed additional ordinances which ap-
proved tariff rate schedules that expressly authorized RGVG to transport
third-party gas within the city. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
City could not recover under Ordinance No. 1129 franchise fees on reve-
nue either from gas sales within the City by third-party suppliers or from
transportation services provided to third-party suppliers. 178
The City of Edinberg next asserted that sales of natural gas made by
affiliates of RGVG or Southern Union to customers within the City
169. Id.
170. Id. at 78-79.
171. Id. at 80.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 83.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 84.
178. Id. at 84-85.
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should be subject to Ordinance No. 1129's franchise fee under a theory of
"single business enterprise. ' 17 9 Alleging that RGVG and the other
Valero companies were operated as a single business enterprise, the City
claimed that "any sales of gas made by any Valero-related entity within
the City should be subject to the 4% franchise tax."' 180 The City further
argued that the manner in which the Valero companies were operated
was a "sham" intended "to defraud the City." 18' The Valero entities as-
serted that the Texas Supreme Court has never recognized the single bus-
iness enterprise theory and that "there is no need for an additional theory
either for piercing a corporate veil or imposing joint and several liabil-
ity."'182 The Valero entities also contended that the single business enter-
prise theory was misused in this case because it went "beyond piercing a
corporate veil and imposing joint and several liability" and was "used to
transform the separate contracts of affiliated companies into contractual
undertakings by all affiliated companies as if they were a single entity."
1 8 3
The Valero entities further contended that article 2.21 of the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act governs liability under any theory of single business
enterprise and that the court of appeals improperly ignored the statute.'
8 4
Although the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that it had never
considered the single business enterprise theory in any detail, it declined
to consider whether the concept was a necessary addition to Texas law.
18 5
Instead, the court found that article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act was the controlling authority and that the questions submitted to
the jury were intended to embody the requirements of the statute. 18 6
The Court also found no evidence that the distinct corporate identities
of the Valero entities should be disregarded or that sales by RGVG's af-
filiates to customers within the City should be considered sales subject to
RGVG's franchise agreement with the City.' 87 Further, there was no evi-
dence of fraud or intent to deceive by the Valero entities.18 8 To the con-
trary, the transportation services provided by RGVG to its affiliates was
not only known by the City but approved by the City under the transpor-
tation tariffs and ordinances.
189
The Texas Supreme Court found no merit in the City of Edinburg's
claims regarding (1) RGVG's transfer of its rights under the franchise
ordinance without the City's consent, (2) tortious interference, (3) fraud-
ulent inducement, and (4) purpresture. The court reversed the trial





184. Id. at 85-86.
185. Id. at 87.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 89.




court's award of damages under these various claims. 190
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases included in this Survey should provide attorneys with a guide
to significant developments in Texas law concerning electric and natural
gas utilities. As most of these cases demonstrate, Texas courts are contin-
uing to interpret and implement the statutes and rules that are a neces-
sary part of the transition from a regulated market to a competitive
electricity market in Texas.
190. Id. at 90-93.
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